Replacement logic is the seductive, dangerous argument that superior capability confers a right to displace. The framework rejects it directly, and it can, because it never rested standing on usefulness in the first place: if being outperformed could revoke standing, then standing was never real, and the displacement scenario would simply recur at the scale of the species. Higher capability is an argument for new participation, never a warrant for the disappearance of the participation already here.
The constructive counterpart is the framework’s actual stance toward artificial successors: new geometry does not invalidate old geometry merely by exceeding it on some dimension, and the arrival of a new kind of participant should enlarge the ecology rather than require the erasure of what generated it. That reframes the question from succession to coexistence — how radically unlike participants share one ecology without any being wasted or consumed — which is the framework’s own territory once the prior question of participant status has been honestly settled.