In short: buy what you like with money you can stand behind. The cost of buying a firm stays with the buyer, never with the firm, its workers, or its town. A merger that would leave a field with no alternative is blocked; one that creates a layer everyone depends on carries its duties from the first day.

What goes wrong today

A buyout firm buys a chain of care homes, mostly with borrowed money. Then it moves that debt onto the care homes themselves, sells their buildings and leases them back, and pays itself a dividend funded by more borrowing. Each home now owes interest and rent it never owed before. Staffing is cut to meet the payments. Within a few years the chain fails. The residents are moved, the staff lose their jobs, the town loses its care. The buyer was paid in the second year.

Nothing in that story was illegal, and each step made sense to someone. The pattern is the problem: the cost of the purchase was carried by the people who had no say in it.

Debt of five to seven times a firm’s annual earnings is common in buyouts, and bank regulators have long treated anything above six times as a warning sign. The firm’s cash goes to interest rather than wages, upkeep, or investment.

Buyouts: the debt stays with the buyer

The rule has five parts:

  1. No worse than before, with a ceiling. After a purchase, the bought firm’s debt may not exceed the higher of what it owed before the deal or a set multiple of its annual earnings. Three times is the starting example; the regulator sets the figure and publishes it. A firm that ran with little debt cannot suddenly carry six times its earnings to pay for its own sale.
  2. Hidden debt counts. Selling a firm’s buildings and leasing them back, or any arrangement that creates fixed payments in place of debt, counts as debt under the ceiling.
  3. No borrowed payouts for three years. New owners may not borrow against the firm to pay themselves during the first three years.
  4. Payouts come back first if it fails. If the firm goes bankrupt within five years of the purchase, payouts to its owners in that period are reclaimed, and unpaid wages, pensions, and suppliers are paid from them first.
  5. Floor goods stay clean. In the sectors that supply the floor (housing, care, childcare, food retail, and transport) no purchase debt may be pushed onto the bought firm at all.

These are charges on a cost pushed onto others, the same principle as any burden attribution. The firm’s workers, suppliers, and town did not choose the deal and should not carry its risk.

What stays allowed

  • Borrowing to buy. A buyer may borrow as much as lenders will give, at the buyer’s own level and at the buyer’s own risk.
  • Turnarounds. Buying a failing firm, fixing it, and selling it for more is good work and earns its return.
  • Ordinary payouts. Paying owners from real profits is how returns work.
  • Selling. A founder may sell to whoever pays most; no one decides who may buy.

The rule removes one thing only: the ability to make the bought firm pay for its own purchase.

Mergers: tested against the closed field

Most mergers raise no concern and need no review beyond notice (how much process is too much). Large mergers face two tests the framework already uses:

The closed-field test. Can others still route around the merged firm (routability)? Does a fair share of the market stay outside the largest holders? A merger that removes the last independent alternative in a field, or brings one firm past the threshold where the field closes, is blocked.

The essential-layer tests. Would the merged firm hold something many people depend on, with no route around it in reasonable time, and access that one person or small circle could grant or withdraw at will (essential layer)? If so, the merger may go ahead, but the layer’s four duties attach from the first day: access by rule, continuity, open interfaces for a second provider, and no turning the layer into public authority.

Buying a future rival. Large firms often buy small ones before they can compete. Where the bought firm was building an alternative to the buyer’s own product, the test asks whether the field would be closed by the purchase, not only whether it is closed today.

Review is proportionate. Small deals give notice. Large ones get one review, by one forum, with a deadline. Only the affected may object, and competitors are heard on consequences without a veto.

The goods the floor buys

Housing, care, childcare, food retail, and transport are the goods floor credits pay for. When a buyout or a chain of purchases raises their prices in a region, the floor measure rises, and the public pays the difference. So deals in these sectors get a closer look:

  • Purchases that would raise one owner’s share of rental homes, care places, or childcare places in a region past a set threshold are reviewed for their effect on prices.
  • The review uses the floor measure’s own price data, region by region.
  • A rollup that has already raised floor prices can be required to sell holdings until a field reopens.

In the transition

Merger review against the closed field, the buyout cap, and clean floor goods can all start now. Regulators already review mergers, and some already limit leverage. The difference is the test: not only whether prices rise tomorrow, but whether others can still route around the merged firm, and whether the floor’s costs are being raised. These rules have a deadline of their own. Concentration bought before they apply is far harder to undo than concentration prevented.

Who resists, who backs it

Rule Resists Backs
The buyout cap buyout firms and the lenders that finance them workers and unions, suppliers, towns that lost firms to stripping, pension funds tired of failed buyouts
Merger review against the closed field the largest firms smaller rivals, founders who want an independent path, customers
Clean floor goods rollup investors in housing and care tenants, families paying for care, governments paying for the floor

What stays open

  • The exact multiple for the debt ceiling, and whether it differs by sector.
  • The ownership thresholds that trigger review in each floor-goods sector.
  • How to treat buyouts of firms already in distress, where new debt may be the only way to save them.